GitHub-Mirror/NeoStats-NeoIRCd
Archived
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

hybrid rc4 rsarespond fixes

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
fishwaldo 2002-09-21 06:26:56 +00:00
parent 19b410a8a8
commit b5907098c0
2 changed files with 41 additions and 7 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

12
tools/rsa_respond/README
View file

@ -6,13 +6,17 @@ respond takes the challenge from the server and creates a valid response
to pass back to the server.
Syntax:
$ ./respond <private key> <challenge>
$ ./respond <private key> <challenge> [passphrase]
Notes:
The private key file is protected by a passphrase, entered when the key is
created. The passphrase is prompted for whenever respond is called.
If the passphrase is passed on the command line (insecure mode), the
program will not prompt for a passphrase. This is primarily for running
rsa_respond from a script.
Compiling:
Untar the distribution
@ -25,7 +29,7 @@ Note that you may have to explicitly add -L/usr/local/lib if OpenSSL
was installed there, instead of one of the system library paths.
System support:
genkey and respond compile properly, and have been tested on FreeBSD 4.x,
Linux glibc, and Cygwin 1.2 or higher.
respond compiles properly, and have been tested on FreeBSD 4.x, Linux glibc,
Solaris 8, and Cygwin 1.2 or higher.
# $Id: README,v 1.2 2002/08/13 14:45:13 fishwaldo Exp $
# $Id: README,v 1.3 2002/09/21 06:26:56 fishwaldo Exp $

36
tools/rsa_respond/respond.c
View file

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
* $Id: respond.c,v 1.2 2002/08/13 14:45:13 fishwaldo Exp $
* $Id: respond.c,v 1.3 2002/09/21 06:26:56 fishwaldo Exp $
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
@ -26,10 +26,27 @@
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static int insecure_mode = 0;
static char *pass_param = NULL;
static int pass_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
{
int len;
char *tmp;
if (insecure_mode != 0)
{
if (pass_param == NULL)
return 0;
len = strlen(pass_param);
if (len <= 0) /* This SHOULDN'T happen */
return 0;
if (len > size)
len = size;
memcpy(buf, pass_param, len);
return len;
}
tmp = getpass("Enter passphrase for challenge: ");
len = strlen(tmp);
if (len <= 0)
@ -40,7 +57,6 @@ static int pass_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
return len;
}
static void
binary_to_hex( unsigned char * bin, char * hex, int length )
{
@ -92,10 +108,24 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
/* respond privatefile challenge */
if (argc < 3)
{
puts("Usage: respond privatefile challenge");
puts("Usage: respond privatefile challenge [passphrase]");
return 0;
}
if (argc == 4)
{
/* This is TOTALLY insecure and not recommended, but for
** interfacing with irc client scripts, it's either this
** or don't use a passphrase.
**
** The likelihood of a passphrase leaking isn't TOO great,
** only ps auxww will show it, and even then, only at the
** precise moment this is called.
*/
insecure_mode = 1;
pass_param = argv[3];
}
if (!(kfile = fopen(argv[1], "r")))
{
puts("Could not open the private keyfile.");