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Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Browse source 
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

  IMA:
   - provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules

  KEYS:
   - add a system blacklist keyring

   - add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
     functionality to userland via keyctl()

  LSM:
   - harden LSM API with __ro_after_init

   - add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux

   - revive security_task_alloc hook

  TPM:
   - implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
  tpm: Fix reference count to main device
  tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
  tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
  tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
  keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
  apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
  apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
  apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
  apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
  security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
  apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
  Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
  smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
  KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
  KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
  KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
  KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
  KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
  KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2017-05-03 08:50:52 -07:00
commit 0302e28dee
95 changed files with 3243 additions and 1123 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

6
security/selinux/Kconfig
View file

@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable"
depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
select SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
default n
help
This option enables writing to a selinuxfs node 'disable', which
@ -50,6 +51,11 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
portability across platforms where boot parameters are difficult
to employ.
NOTE: selecting this option will disable the '__ro_after_init'
kernel hardening feature for security hooks. Please consider
using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this
option.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP

26
security/selinux/hooks.c
View file

@ -3920,6 +3920,21 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
}
int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
unsigned int flags)
{
u32 av = 0;
if (!flags)
return 0;
if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
@ -4352,10 +4367,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
u32 sid, node_perm;
if (family == PF_INET) {
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
} else {
if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
@ -6108,7 +6131,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#endif
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
@ -6206,6 +6229,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),

2
security/selinux/include/classmap.h
View file

@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"getattr", "setexec", "setfscreate", "noatsecure", "siginh",
"setrlimit", "rlimitinh", "dyntransition", "setcurrent",
"execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
"setsockcreate", NULL } },
"setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
{ "system",
{ "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
"syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },

10
security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
View file

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct nlmsg_perm {
u32 perm;
};
static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
{
{ RTM_NEWLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ RTM_DELLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
{ RTM_GETSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
};
static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
{
{ TCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
{ SOCK_DESTROY, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
};
static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
{
{ XFRM_MSG_NEWSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ XFRM_MSG_DELSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] =
{ XFRM_MSG_MAPPING, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
};
static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
{
{ AUDIT_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ AUDIT_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
};
static int nlmsg_perm(u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm, struct nlmsg_perm *tab, size_t tabsize)
static int nlmsg_perm(u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm, const struct nlmsg_perm *tab, size_t tabsize)
{
int i, err = -EINVAL;

8
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
View file

@ -1456,10 +1456,10 @@ static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct avc_cache_stats *st = v;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
seq_printf(seq, "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims "
"frees\n");
else {
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq,
"lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees\n");
} else {
unsigned int lookups = st->lookups;
unsigned int misses = st->misses;
unsigned int hits = lookups - misses;

14
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
View file

@ -176,8 +176,9 @@ void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
{
kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
p->bool_val_to_struct =
kmalloc(p->p_bools.nprim * sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum *), GFP_KERNEL);
p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(p->p_bools.nprim,
sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
@ -226,7 +227,7 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
u32 len;
int rc;
booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum), GFP_KERNEL);
booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*booldatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!booldatum)
return -ENOMEM;
@ -331,7 +332,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
goto err;
}
list = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_av_list), GFP_KERNEL);
list = kzalloc(sizeof(*list), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!list) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
@ -420,7 +421,7 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
goto err;
rc = -ENOMEM;
expr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_expr), GFP_KERNEL);
expr = kzalloc(sizeof(*expr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!expr)
goto err;
@ -471,7 +472,7 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
node = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_node), GFP_KERNEL);
node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!node)
goto err;
@ -663,5 +664,4 @@ void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
(node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
}
return;
}

10
security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
View file

@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *
u32 i;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL)
if (!p)
return p;
p->size = size;
p->nel = 0;
p->hash_value = hash_value;
p->keycmp = keycmp;
p->htable = kmalloc(sizeof(*(p->htable)) * size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (p->htable == NULL) {
p->htable = kmalloc_array(size, sizeof(*p->htable), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->htable) {
kfree(p);
return NULL;
}
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
return -EEXIST;
newnode = kzalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_KERNEL);
if (newnode == NULL)
if (!newnode)
return -ENOMEM;
newnode->key = key;
newnode->datum = datum;
@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *key)
while (cur && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0)
cur = cur->next;
if (cur == NULL || (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) != 0))
if (!cur || (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) != 0))
return NULL;
return cur->datum;

59
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
View file

@ -178,10 +178,9 @@ static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
int rc;
struct role_datum *role;
rc = -ENOMEM;
role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!role)
goto out;
return -ENOMEM;
rc = -EINVAL;
role->value = ++p->p_roles.nprim;
@ -540,23 +539,23 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
#endif
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->class_val_to_struct =
kzalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
p->class_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_classes.nprim,
sizeof(*p->class_val_to_struct),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->role_val_to_struct =
kzalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
p->role_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_roles.nprim,
sizeof(*p->role_val_to_struct),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->user_val_to_struct =
kzalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
p->user_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_users.nprim,
sizeof(*p->user_val_to_struct),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
goto out;
@ -880,8 +879,6 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
return;
}
/*
@ -1120,10 +1117,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[2];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
perdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*perdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!perdatum)
goto bad;
return -ENOMEM;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc)
@ -1154,10 +1150,9 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
u32 len, nel;
int i, rc;
rc = -ENOMEM;
comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!comdatum)
goto bad;
return -ENOMEM;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc)
@ -1320,10 +1315,9 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
u32 len, len2, ncons, nel;
int i, rc;
rc = -ENOMEM;
cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cladatum)
goto bad;
return -ENOMEM;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*6);
if (rc)
@ -1414,10 +1408,9 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!role)
goto bad;
return -ENOMEM;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
to_read = 3;
@ -1471,10 +1464,9 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[4];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!typdatum)
goto bad;
return -ENOMEM;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
to_read = 4;
@ -1546,10 +1538,9 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
usrdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!usrdatum)
goto bad;
return -ENOMEM;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
to_read = 3;
@ -1597,10 +1588,9 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[2];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!levdatum)
goto bad;
return -ENOMEM;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc)
@ -1614,7 +1604,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
goto bad;
rc = -ENOMEM;
levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mls_level), GFP_ATOMIC);
levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum->level), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!levdatum->level)
goto bad;
@ -1639,10 +1629,9 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
rc = -ENOMEM;
catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!catdatum)
goto bad;
return -ENOMEM;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc)
@ -1854,7 +1843,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
return rc;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
@ -1931,7 +1920,6 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
ft = NULL;
otype = NULL;
name = NULL;
@ -2008,7 +1996,7 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
return rc;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
@ -2100,9 +2088,10 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
}
rc = 0;
out:
if (newgenfs)
if (newgenfs) {
kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
kfree(newgenfs);
kfree(newgenfs);
}
ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
return rc;

2
security/selinux/ss/services.c
View file

@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
}
k = 0;
while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
while (p_in->perms[k]) {
/* An empty permission string skips ahead */
if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
k++;

6
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
View file

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
{
int i;
s->htable = kmalloc(sizeof(*(s->htable)) * SIDTAB_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
s->htable = kmalloc_array(SIDTAB_SIZE, sizeof(*s->htable), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!s->htable)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++)
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
}
newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (newnode == NULL) {
if (!newnode) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)
if (force && cur && sid == cur->sid && cur->context.len)
return &cur->context;
if (cur == NULL || sid != cur->sid || cur->context.len) {
if (!cur || sid != cur->sid || cur->context.len) {
/* Remap invalid SIDs to the unlabeled SID. */
sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);