CRED: Neuter sys_capset()

Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.

This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.

This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:

 (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.

 (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells 2008-11-14 10:39:14 +11:00 committed by James Morris
parent 8bbf4976b5
commit 1cdcbec1a3
6 changed files with 63 additions and 285 deletions

View file

@ -1790,22 +1790,22 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
static int selinux_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
int error;
error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
error = secondary_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
if (error)
return error;
return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
static void selinux_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
secondary_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)