arm64: initialize ptrauth keys for kernel booting task

This patch uses the existing boot_init_stack_canary arch function
to initialize the ptrauth keys for the booting task in the primary
core. The requirement here is that it should be always inline and
the caller must never return.

As pointer authentication too detects a subset of stack corruption
so it makes sense to place this code here.

Both pointer authentication and stack canary codes are protected
by their respective config option.

Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Amit Daniel Kachhap 2020-03-13 14:34:57 +05:30 committed by Catalin Marinas
parent 33e4523498
commit 2832158233
3 changed files with 16 additions and 2 deletions

View file

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR) || defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH)
# include <asm/stackprotector.h>
#else
static inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)