mirror of
https://github.com/Fishwaldo/Star64_linux.git
synced 2025-06-27 00:51:35 +00:00
make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'
Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok() separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the direct (optimized) user access. But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok() at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has actually been range-checked. If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But nothing really forces the range check. By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people trying to avoid them. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
0b2c8f8b6b
commit
594cc251fd
7 changed files with 36 additions and 20 deletions
|
@ -114,10 +114,11 @@ long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
|
|||
|
||||
kasan_check_write(dst, count);
|
||||
check_object_size(dst, count, false);
|
||||
user_access_begin();
|
||||
retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max);
|
||||
user_access_end();
|
||||
return retval;
|
||||
if (user_access_begin(src, max)) {
|
||||
retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max);
|
||||
user_access_end();
|
||||
return retval;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return -EFAULT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue