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Printk changes for 4.20

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Merge tag 'printk-for-4.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pmladek/printk

Pull printk updates from Petr Mladek:

 - Fix two more locations where printf formatting leaked pointers

 - Better log_buf_len parameter handling

 - Add prefix to messages from printk code

 - Do not miss messages on other consoles when the log is replayed on a
   new one

 - Reduce race between console registration and panic() when the log
   might get replayed on all consoles

 - Some cont buffer code clean up

 - Call console only when there is something to do (log vs cont buffer)

* tag 'printk-for-4.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pmladek/printk:
  lib/vsprintf: Hash printed address for netdev bits fallback
  lib/vsprintf: Hash legacy clock addresses
  lib/vsprintf: Prepare for more general use of ptr_to_id()
  lib/vsprintf: Make ptr argument conts in ptr_to_id()
  printk: fix integer overflow in setup_log_buf()
  printk: do not preliminary split up cont buffer
  printk: lock/unlock console only for new logbuf entries
  printk: keep kernel cont support always enabled
  printk: Give error on attempt to set log buffer length to over 2G
  printk: Add KBUILD_MODNAME and remove a redundant print prefix
  printk: Correct wrong casting
  printk: Fix panic caused by passing log_buf_len to command line
  printk: CON_PRINTBUFFER console registration is a bit racy
  printk: Do not miss new messages when replaying the log
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2018-10-25 17:11:52 -07:00
commit a67eefad99
3 changed files with 158 additions and 149 deletions
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216
lib/vsprintf.c
View file

@ -612,6 +612,109 @@ char *string(char *buf, char *end, const char *s, struct printf_spec spec)
return widen_string(buf, len, end, spec);
}
static noinline_for_stack
char *pointer_string(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
struct printf_spec spec)
{
spec.base = 16;
spec.flags |= SMALL;
if (spec.field_width == -1) {
spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
}
return number(buf, end, (unsigned long int)ptr, spec);
}
/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */
static int debug_boot_weak_hash __ro_after_init;
static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable(char *str)
{
debug_boot_weak_hash = 1;
pr_info("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n");
return 0;
}
early_param("debug_boot_weak_hash", debug_boot_weak_hash_enable);
static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key);
static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
{
get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
/* Needs to run from preemptible context */
static_branch_disable(&not_filled_random_ptr_key);
}
static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
{
/* This may be in an interrupt handler. */
queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
}
static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
.func = fill_random_ptr_key
};
static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
{
int key_size = sizeof(ptr_key);
int ret;
/* Use hw RNG if available. */
if (get_random_bytes_arch(&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) {
static_branch_disable(&not_filled_random_ptr_key);
return 0;
}
ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
if (!ret) {
return 0;
} else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
/* This is in preemptible context */
enable_ptr_key_workfn(&enable_ptr_key_work);
return 0;
}
return ret;
}
early_initcall(initialize_ptr_random);
/* Maps a pointer to a 32 bit unique identifier. */
static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
struct printf_spec spec)
{
const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)";
unsigned long hashval;
/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash. */
if (unlikely(debug_boot_weak_hash)) {
hashval = hash_long((unsigned long)ptr, 32);
return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
}
if (static_branch_unlikely(&not_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
/* string length must be less than default_width */
return string(buf, end, str, spec);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key);
/*
* Mask off the first 32 bits, this makes explicit that we have
* modified the address (and 32 bits is plenty for a unique ID).
*/
hashval = hashval & 0xffffffff;
#else
hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u32((u32)ptr, &ptr_key);
#endif
return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
}
static noinline_for_stack
char *dentry_name(char *buf, char *end, const struct dentry *d, struct printf_spec spec,
const char *fmt)
@ -1357,20 +1460,6 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,
return string(buf, end, uuid, spec);
}
static noinline_for_stack
char *pointer_string(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
struct printf_spec spec)
{
spec.base = 16;
spec.flags |= SMALL;
if (spec.field_width == -1) {
spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
}
return number(buf, end, (unsigned long int)ptr, spec);
}
int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
static noinline_for_stack
@ -1421,7 +1510,8 @@ char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
}
static noinline_for_stack
char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr, const char *fmt)
char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr,
struct printf_spec spec, const char *fmt)
{
unsigned long long num;
int size;
@ -1432,9 +1522,7 @@ char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr, const char *fmt)
size = sizeof(netdev_features_t);
break;
default:
num = (unsigned long)addr;
size = sizeof(unsigned long);
break;
return ptr_to_id(buf, end, addr, spec);
}
return special_hex_number(buf, end, num, size);
@ -1474,7 +1562,7 @@ char *clock(char *buf, char *end, struct clk *clk, struct printf_spec spec,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMMON_CLK
return string(buf, end, __clk_get_name(clk), spec);
#else
return special_hex_number(buf, end, (unsigned long)clk, sizeof(unsigned long));
return ptr_to_id(buf, end, clk, spec);
#endif
}
}
@ -1651,94 +1739,6 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
}
/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */
static int debug_boot_weak_hash __ro_after_init;
static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable(char *str)
{
debug_boot_weak_hash = 1;
pr_info("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n");
return 0;
}
early_param("debug_boot_weak_hash", debug_boot_weak_hash_enable);
static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key);
static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
{
get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
/* Needs to run from preemptible context */
static_branch_disable(&not_filled_random_ptr_key);
}
static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
{
/* This may be in an interrupt handler. */
queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
}
static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
.func = fill_random_ptr_key
};
static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
{
int key_size = sizeof(ptr_key);
int ret;
/* Use hw RNG if available. */
if (get_random_bytes_arch(&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) {
static_branch_disable(&not_filled_random_ptr_key);
return 0;
}
ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
if (!ret) {
return 0;
} else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
/* This is in preemptible context */
enable_ptr_key_workfn(&enable_ptr_key_work);
return 0;
}
return ret;
}
early_initcall(initialize_ptr_random);
/* Maps a pointer to a 32 bit unique identifier. */
static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
{
const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)";
unsigned long hashval;
/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash. */
if (unlikely(debug_boot_weak_hash)) {
hashval = hash_long((unsigned long)ptr, 32);
return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
}
if (static_branch_unlikely(&not_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
/* string length must be less than default_width */
return string(buf, end, str, spec);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key);
/*
* Mask off the first 32 bits, this makes explicit that we have
* modified the address (and 32 bits is plenty for a unique ID).
*/
hashval = hashval & 0xffffffff;
#else
hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u32((u32)ptr, &ptr_key);
#endif
return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
}
/*
* Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed
* by an extra set of alphanumeric characters that are extended format
@ -1942,7 +1942,7 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
break;
return restricted_pointer(buf, end, ptr, spec);
case 'N':
return netdev_bits(buf, end, ptr, fmt);
return netdev_bits(buf, end, ptr, spec, fmt);
case 'a':
return address_val(buf, end, ptr, fmt);
case 'd':