mm: Hardened usercopy

This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.

This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
being copied to/from:
- address range doesn't wrap around
- address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
- if on the slab allocator:
  - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
    implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
- otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
  and CMA ranges)
- if on the stack
  - object must not extend before/after the current process stack
  - object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
    arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
- object must not overlap with kernel text

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
This commit is contained in:
Kees Cook 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -07:00
parent 0f60a8efe4
commit f5509cc18d
5 changed files with 327 additions and 0 deletions

View file

@ -155,6 +155,18 @@ void kfree(const void *);
void kzfree(const void *);
size_t ksize(const void *);
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
struct page *page);
#else
static inline const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr,
unsigned long n,
struct page *page)
{
return NULL;
}
#endif
/*
* Some archs want to perform DMA into kmalloc caches and need a guaranteed
* alignment larger than the alignment of a 64-bit integer.