Star64_linux/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
Kees Cook b64fcae74b LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().

Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)

Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.

With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.

Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-05 13:37:03 +02:00

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C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/efi_embedded_fw.h>
#include <linux/property.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "fallback.h"
#include "firmware.h"
int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
{
const u8 *data;
size_t size;
int rc;
if (!(opt_flags & FW_OPT_FALLBACK_PLATFORM))
return -ENOENT;
rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = efi_get_embedded_fw(fw_priv->fw_name, &data, &size);
if (rc)
return rc; /* rc == -ENOENT when the fw was not found */
if (fw_priv->data && size > fw_priv->allocated_size)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!fw_priv->data)
fw_priv->data = vmalloc(size);
if (!fw_priv->data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(fw_priv->data, data, size);
fw_priv->size = size;
fw_state_done(fw_priv);
return 0;
}