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CRED: Neuter sys_capset()

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Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.

This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.

This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:

 (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.

 (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells 2008-11-14 10:39:14 +11:00 • committed by James Morris
parent 8bbf4976b5
commit 1cdcbec1a3
6 changed files with 63 additions and 285 deletions
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20
security/security.c
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@ -145,20 +145,18 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
int security_capset_check(struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
return security_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
void security_capset_set(struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
int security_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
security_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
return security_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
void security_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
security_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)