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LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data(). Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in a subsequent patch.) Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false (which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook once the buffer is loaded. With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads (e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen in subsequent patches. Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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12 changed files with 82 additions and 15 deletions
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@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode);
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extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
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extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
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extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot);
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extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
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extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
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extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
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enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
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extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
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extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
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enum kernel_read_file_id id);
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@ -78,7 +80,14 @@ static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
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static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
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enum kernel_load_data_id id,
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char *description)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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