mirror of
https://github.com/Fishwaldo/linux-bl808.git
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCYCegywAKCRCRxhvAZXjc ouJ6AQDlf+7jCQlQdeKKoN9QDFfMzG1ooemat36EpRRTONaGuAD8D9A4sUsG4+5f 4IU5Lj9oY4DEmF8HenbWK2ZHsesL2Qg= =yPaw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner: "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and maintainers. Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here are just a few: - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the implementation of portable home directories in systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at login time. - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged containers without having to change ownership permanently through chown(2). - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their Linux subsystem. - It is possible to share files between containers with non-overlapping idmappings. - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC) permission checking. - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of all files. - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home directory and container and vm scenario. - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only apply as long as the mount exists. Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull this: - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away in their implementation of portable home directories. https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/ - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734 - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is ported. - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers. I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones: https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/ This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and xfs: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to merge this. In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount. By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace. The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the testsuite. Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is currently marked with. The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern of extensibility. The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped mount: - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in. - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts. - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped. - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem. The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler. By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no behavioral or performance changes are observed. The manpage with a detailed description can be found here: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8 In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify that port has been done correctly. The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform mounts based on file descriptors only. Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2() RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and path resolution. While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing. With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api, covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and projects. There is a simple tool available at https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you decide to pull this in the following weeks: Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home directory: u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 .. -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 .. -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: mnt/my-file # owner: u1001 # group: u1001 user::rw- user:u1001:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r-- u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: home/ubuntu/my-file # owner: ubuntu # group: ubuntu user::rw- user:ubuntu:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r--" * tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits) xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl xfs: support idmapped mounts ext4: support idmapped mounts fat: handle idmapped mounts tests: add mount_setattr() selftests fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP fs: add mount_setattr() fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper fs: split out functions to hold writers namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags nfs: do not export idmapped mounts overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ima: handle idmapped mounts apparmor: handle idmapped mounts fs: make helpers idmap mount aware exec: handle idmapped mounts would_dump: handle idmapped mounts ...
815 lines
20 KiB
C
815 lines
20 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* fs/f2fs/xattr.c
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2012 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
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* http://www.samsung.com/
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*
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* Portions of this code from linux/fs/ext2/xattr.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2001-2003 Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
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*
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* Fix by Harrison Xing <harrison@mountainviewdata.com>.
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* Extended attributes for symlinks and special files added per
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* suggestion of Luka Renko <luka.renko@hermes.si>.
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* xattr consolidation Copyright (c) 2004 James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>,
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* Red Hat Inc.
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*/
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#include <linux/rwsem.h>
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#include <linux/f2fs_fs.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
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#include "f2fs.h"
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#include "xattr.h"
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#include "segment.h"
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static void *xattr_alloc(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int size, bool *is_inline)
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{
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if (likely(size == sbi->inline_xattr_slab_size)) {
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*is_inline = true;
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return kmem_cache_zalloc(sbi->inline_xattr_slab, GFP_NOFS);
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}
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*is_inline = false;
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return f2fs_kzalloc(sbi, size, GFP_NOFS);
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}
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static void xattr_free(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, void *xattr_addr,
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bool is_inline)
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{
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if (is_inline)
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kmem_cache_free(sbi->inline_xattr_slab, xattr_addr);
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else
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kfree(xattr_addr);
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}
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static int f2fs_xattr_generic_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
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struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
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const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
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{
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struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(inode->i_sb);
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switch (handler->flags) {
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case F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_USER:
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if (!test_opt(sbi, XATTR_USER))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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break;
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case F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED:
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case F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY:
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break;
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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return f2fs_getxattr(inode, handler->flags, name,
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buffer, size, NULL);
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}
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static int f2fs_xattr_generic_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
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struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
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const char *name, const void *value,
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size_t size, int flags)
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{
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struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(inode->i_sb);
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switch (handler->flags) {
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case F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_USER:
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if (!test_opt(sbi, XATTR_USER))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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break;
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case F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED:
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case F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY:
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break;
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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return f2fs_setxattr(inode, handler->flags, name,
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value, size, NULL, flags);
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}
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static bool f2fs_xattr_user_list(struct dentry *dentry)
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{
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struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(dentry->d_sb);
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return test_opt(sbi, XATTR_USER);
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}
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static bool f2fs_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry)
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{
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return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
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}
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static int f2fs_xattr_advise_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
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struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
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const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
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{
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if (buffer)
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*((char *)buffer) = F2FS_I(inode)->i_advise;
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return sizeof(char);
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}
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static int f2fs_xattr_advise_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
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struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
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struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
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const char *name, const void *value,
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size_t size, int flags)
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{
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unsigned char old_advise = F2FS_I(inode)->i_advise;
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unsigned char new_advise;
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&init_user_ns, inode))
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return -EPERM;
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if (value == NULL)
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return -EINVAL;
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new_advise = *(char *)value;
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if (new_advise & ~FADVISE_MODIFIABLE_BITS)
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return -EINVAL;
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new_advise = new_advise & FADVISE_MODIFIABLE_BITS;
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new_advise |= old_advise & ~FADVISE_MODIFIABLE_BITS;
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F2FS_I(inode)->i_advise = new_advise;
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f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode, true);
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return 0;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_SECURITY
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static int f2fs_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array,
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void *page)
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{
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const struct xattr *xattr;
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int err = 0;
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for (xattr = xattr_array; xattr->name != NULL; xattr++) {
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err = f2fs_setxattr(inode, F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
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xattr->name, xattr->value,
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xattr->value_len, (struct page *)page, 0);
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if (err < 0)
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break;
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}
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return err;
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}
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int f2fs_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
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const struct qstr *qstr, struct page *ipage)
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{
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return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
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&f2fs_initxattrs, ipage);
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}
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#endif
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const struct xattr_handler f2fs_xattr_user_handler = {
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.prefix = XATTR_USER_PREFIX,
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.flags = F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_USER,
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.list = f2fs_xattr_user_list,
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.get = f2fs_xattr_generic_get,
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.set = f2fs_xattr_generic_set,
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};
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const struct xattr_handler f2fs_xattr_trusted_handler = {
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.prefix = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
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.flags = F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED,
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.list = f2fs_xattr_trusted_list,
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.get = f2fs_xattr_generic_get,
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.set = f2fs_xattr_generic_set,
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};
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const struct xattr_handler f2fs_xattr_advise_handler = {
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.name = F2FS_SYSTEM_ADVISE_NAME,
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.flags = F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_ADVISE,
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.get = f2fs_xattr_advise_get,
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.set = f2fs_xattr_advise_set,
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};
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const struct xattr_handler f2fs_xattr_security_handler = {
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.prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
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.flags = F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
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.get = f2fs_xattr_generic_get,
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.set = f2fs_xattr_generic_set,
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};
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static const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler_map[] = {
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[F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_USER] = &f2fs_xattr_user_handler,
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#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL
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[F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS] = &posix_acl_access_xattr_handler,
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[F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT] = &posix_acl_default_xattr_handler,
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#endif
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[F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED] = &f2fs_xattr_trusted_handler,
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#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_SECURITY
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[F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY] = &f2fs_xattr_security_handler,
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#endif
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[F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_ADVISE] = &f2fs_xattr_advise_handler,
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};
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const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handlers[] = {
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&f2fs_xattr_user_handler,
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#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL
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&posix_acl_access_xattr_handler,
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&posix_acl_default_xattr_handler,
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#endif
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&f2fs_xattr_trusted_handler,
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#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_SECURITY
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&f2fs_xattr_security_handler,
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#endif
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&f2fs_xattr_advise_handler,
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NULL,
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};
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static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
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{
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const struct xattr_handler *handler = NULL;
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if (index > 0 && index < ARRAY_SIZE(f2fs_xattr_handler_map))
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handler = f2fs_xattr_handler_map[index];
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return handler;
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}
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static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
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void *last_base_addr, int index,
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size_t len, const char *name)
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{
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struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
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list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
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if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
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(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr)
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return NULL;
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if (entry->e_name_index != index)
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continue;
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if (entry->e_name_len != len)
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continue;
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if (!memcmp(entry->e_name, name, len))
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break;
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}
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return entry;
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}
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static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_inline_xattr(struct inode *inode,
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void *base_addr, void **last_addr, int index,
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size_t len, const char *name)
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{
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struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
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unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
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void *max_addr = base_addr + inline_size;
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list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
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if ((void *)entry + sizeof(__u32) > max_addr ||
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(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > max_addr) {
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*last_addr = entry;
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return NULL;
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}
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if (entry->e_name_index != index)
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continue;
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if (entry->e_name_len != len)
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continue;
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if (!memcmp(entry->e_name, name, len))
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break;
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}
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/* inline xattr header or entry across max inline xattr size */
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if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(entry) &&
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(void *)entry + sizeof(__u32) > max_addr) {
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*last_addr = entry;
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return NULL;
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}
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return entry;
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}
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static int read_inline_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
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void *txattr_addr)
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{
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struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
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unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
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struct page *page = NULL;
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void *inline_addr;
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if (ipage) {
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inline_addr = inline_xattr_addr(inode, ipage);
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} else {
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page = f2fs_get_node_page(sbi, inode->i_ino);
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if (IS_ERR(page))
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return PTR_ERR(page);
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inline_addr = inline_xattr_addr(inode, page);
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}
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memcpy(txattr_addr, inline_addr, inline_size);
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f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
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|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int read_xattr_block(struct inode *inode, void *txattr_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
|
|
nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
|
|
unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
|
|
struct page *xpage;
|
|
void *xattr_addr;
|
|
|
|
/* The inode already has an extended attribute block. */
|
|
xpage = f2fs_get_node_page(sbi, xnid);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(xpage))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(xpage);
|
|
|
|
xattr_addr = page_address(xpage);
|
|
memcpy(txattr_addr + inline_size, xattr_addr, VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
f2fs_put_page(xpage, 1);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int lookup_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
|
|
unsigned int index, unsigned int len,
|
|
const char *name, struct f2fs_xattr_entry **xe,
|
|
void **base_addr, int *base_size,
|
|
bool *is_inline)
|
|
{
|
|
void *cur_addr, *txattr_addr, *last_txattr_addr;
|
|
void *last_addr = NULL;
|
|
nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
|
|
unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
if (!xnid && !inline_size)
|
|
return -ENODATA;
|
|
|
|
*base_size = XATTR_SIZE(inode) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
|
|
txattr_addr = xattr_alloc(F2FS_I_SB(inode), *base_size, is_inline);
|
|
if (!txattr_addr)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
last_txattr_addr = (void *)txattr_addr + XATTR_SIZE(inode);
|
|
|
|
/* read from inline xattr */
|
|
if (inline_size) {
|
|
err = read_inline_xattr(inode, ipage, txattr_addr);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
*xe = __find_inline_xattr(inode, txattr_addr, &last_addr,
|
|
index, len, name);
|
|
if (*xe) {
|
|
*base_size = inline_size;
|
|
goto check;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* read from xattr node block */
|
|
if (xnid) {
|
|
err = read_xattr_block(inode, txattr_addr);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (last_addr)
|
|
cur_addr = XATTR_HDR(last_addr) - 1;
|
|
else
|
|
cur_addr = txattr_addr;
|
|
|
|
*xe = __find_xattr(cur_addr, last_txattr_addr, index, len, name);
|
|
if (!*xe) {
|
|
f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "inode (%lu) has corrupted xattr",
|
|
inode->i_ino);
|
|
set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK);
|
|
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
check:
|
|
if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(*xe)) {
|
|
err = -ENODATA;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*base_addr = txattr_addr;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
xattr_free(F2FS_I_SB(inode), txattr_addr, *is_inline);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int read_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct page *ipage,
|
|
void **base_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct f2fs_xattr_header *header;
|
|
nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
|
|
unsigned int size = VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
|
unsigned int inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
|
|
void *txattr_addr;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
txattr_addr = f2fs_kzalloc(F2FS_I_SB(inode),
|
|
inline_size + size + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
if (!txattr_addr)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
/* read from inline xattr */
|
|
if (inline_size) {
|
|
err = read_inline_xattr(inode, ipage, txattr_addr);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* read from xattr node block */
|
|
if (xnid) {
|
|
err = read_xattr_block(inode, txattr_addr);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
header = XATTR_HDR(txattr_addr);
|
|
|
|
/* never been allocated xattrs */
|
|
if (le32_to_cpu(header->h_magic) != F2FS_XATTR_MAGIC) {
|
|
header->h_magic = cpu_to_le32(F2FS_XATTR_MAGIC);
|
|
header->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(1);
|
|
}
|
|
*base_addr = txattr_addr;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
fail:
|
|
kfree(txattr_addr);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int write_all_xattrs(struct inode *inode, __u32 hsize,
|
|
void *txattr_addr, struct page *ipage)
|
|
{
|
|
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
|
|
size_t inline_size = inline_xattr_size(inode);
|
|
struct page *in_page = NULL;
|
|
void *xattr_addr;
|
|
void *inline_addr = NULL;
|
|
struct page *xpage;
|
|
nid_t new_nid = 0;
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (hsize > inline_size && !F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid)
|
|
if (!f2fs_alloc_nid(sbi, &new_nid))
|
|
return -ENOSPC;
|
|
|
|
/* write to inline xattr */
|
|
if (inline_size) {
|
|
if (ipage) {
|
|
inline_addr = inline_xattr_addr(inode, ipage);
|
|
} else {
|
|
in_page = f2fs_get_node_page(sbi, inode->i_ino);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(in_page)) {
|
|
f2fs_alloc_nid_failed(sbi, new_nid);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(in_page);
|
|
}
|
|
inline_addr = inline_xattr_addr(inode, in_page);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(ipage ? ipage : in_page,
|
|
NODE, true, true);
|
|
/* no need to use xattr node block */
|
|
if (hsize <= inline_size) {
|
|
err = f2fs_truncate_xattr_node(inode);
|
|
f2fs_alloc_nid_failed(sbi, new_nid);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
f2fs_put_page(in_page, 1);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(inline_addr, txattr_addr, inline_size);
|
|
set_page_dirty(ipage ? ipage : in_page);
|
|
goto in_page_out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* write to xattr node block */
|
|
if (F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid) {
|
|
xpage = f2fs_get_node_page(sbi, F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(xpage)) {
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(xpage);
|
|
f2fs_alloc_nid_failed(sbi, new_nid);
|
|
goto in_page_out;
|
|
}
|
|
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, new_nid);
|
|
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(xpage, NODE, true, true);
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct dnode_of_data dn;
|
|
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, NULL, NULL, new_nid);
|
|
xpage = f2fs_new_node_page(&dn, XATTR_NODE_OFFSET);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(xpage)) {
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(xpage);
|
|
f2fs_alloc_nid_failed(sbi, new_nid);
|
|
goto in_page_out;
|
|
}
|
|
f2fs_alloc_nid_done(sbi, new_nid);
|
|
}
|
|
xattr_addr = page_address(xpage);
|
|
|
|
if (inline_size)
|
|
memcpy(inline_addr, txattr_addr, inline_size);
|
|
memcpy(xattr_addr, txattr_addr + inline_size, VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
if (inline_size)
|
|
set_page_dirty(ipage ? ipage : in_page);
|
|
set_page_dirty(xpage);
|
|
|
|
f2fs_put_page(xpage, 1);
|
|
in_page_out:
|
|
f2fs_put_page(in_page, 1);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int f2fs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, const char *name,
|
|
void *buffer, size_t buffer_size, struct page *ipage)
|
|
{
|
|
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry = NULL;
|
|
int error;
|
|
unsigned int size, len;
|
|
void *base_addr = NULL;
|
|
int base_size;
|
|
bool is_inline;
|
|
|
|
if (name == NULL)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(name);
|
|
if (len > F2FS_NAME_LEN)
|
|
return -ERANGE;
|
|
|
|
down_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem);
|
|
error = lookup_all_xattrs(inode, ipage, index, len, name,
|
|
&entry, &base_addr, &base_size, &is_inline);
|
|
up_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
size = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size);
|
|
|
|
if (buffer && size > buffer_size) {
|
|
error = -ERANGE;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (buffer) {
|
|
char *pval = entry->e_name + entry->e_name_len;
|
|
|
|
if (base_size - (pval - (char *)base_addr) < size) {
|
|
error = -ERANGE;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(buffer, pval, size);
|
|
}
|
|
error = size;
|
|
out:
|
|
xattr_free(F2FS_I_SB(inode), base_addr, is_inline);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
|
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
|
|
void *base_addr, *last_base_addr;
|
|
int error;
|
|
size_t rest = buffer_size;
|
|
|
|
down_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem);
|
|
error = read_all_xattrs(inode, NULL, &base_addr);
|
|
up_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(inode);
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
|
|
const struct xattr_handler *handler =
|
|
f2fs_xattr_handler(entry->e_name_index);
|
|
const char *prefix;
|
|
size_t prefix_len;
|
|
size_t size;
|
|
|
|
if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
|
|
(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr) {
|
|
f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "inode (%lu) has corrupted xattr",
|
|
inode->i_ino);
|
|
set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK);
|
|
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!handler || (handler->list && !handler->list(dentry)))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
prefix = xattr_prefix(handler);
|
|
prefix_len = strlen(prefix);
|
|
size = prefix_len + entry->e_name_len + 1;
|
|
if (buffer) {
|
|
if (size > rest) {
|
|
error = -ERANGE;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(buffer, prefix, prefix_len);
|
|
buffer += prefix_len;
|
|
memcpy(buffer, entry->e_name, entry->e_name_len);
|
|
buffer += entry->e_name_len;
|
|
*buffer++ = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
rest -= size;
|
|
}
|
|
error = buffer_size - rest;
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
kfree(base_addr);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool f2fs_xattr_value_same(struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry,
|
|
const void *value, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
void *pval = entry->e_name + entry->e_name_len;
|
|
|
|
return (le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size) == size) &&
|
|
!memcmp(pval, value, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
|
|
const char *name, const void *value, size_t size,
|
|
struct page *ipage, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *here, *last;
|
|
void *base_addr, *last_base_addr;
|
|
int found, newsize;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
__u32 new_hsize;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (name == NULL)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (value == NULL)
|
|
size = 0;
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(name);
|
|
|
|
if (len > F2FS_NAME_LEN)
|
|
return -ERANGE;
|
|
|
|
if (size > MAX_VALUE_LEN(inode))
|
|
return -E2BIG;
|
|
|
|
error = read_all_xattrs(inode, ipage, &base_addr);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(inode);
|
|
|
|
/* find entry with wanted name. */
|
|
here = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
|
|
if (!here) {
|
|
f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "inode (%lu) has corrupted xattr",
|
|
inode->i_ino);
|
|
set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK);
|
|
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
|
|
|
|
if (found) {
|
|
if ((flags & XATTR_CREATE)) {
|
|
error = -EEXIST;
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (value && f2fs_xattr_value_same(here, value, size))
|
|
goto same;
|
|
} else if ((flags & XATTR_REPLACE)) {
|
|
error = -ENODATA;
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
last = here;
|
|
while (!IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(last))
|
|
last = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(last);
|
|
|
|
newsize = XATTR_ALIGN(sizeof(struct f2fs_xattr_entry) + len + size);
|
|
|
|
/* 1. Check space */
|
|
if (value) {
|
|
int free;
|
|
/*
|
|
* If value is NULL, it is remove operation.
|
|
* In case of update operation, we calculate free.
|
|
*/
|
|
free = MIN_OFFSET(inode) - ((char *)last - (char *)base_addr);
|
|
if (found)
|
|
free = free + ENTRY_SIZE(here);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(free < newsize)) {
|
|
error = -E2BIG;
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* 2. Remove old entry */
|
|
if (found) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If entry is found, remove old entry.
|
|
* If not found, remove operation is not needed.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *next = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(here);
|
|
int oldsize = ENTRY_SIZE(here);
|
|
|
|
memmove(here, next, (char *)last - (char *)next);
|
|
last = (struct f2fs_xattr_entry *)((char *)last - oldsize);
|
|
memset(last, 0, oldsize);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
new_hsize = (char *)last - (char *)base_addr;
|
|
|
|
/* 3. Write new entry */
|
|
if (value) {
|
|
char *pval;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Before we come here, old entry is removed.
|
|
* We just write new entry.
|
|
*/
|
|
last->e_name_index = index;
|
|
last->e_name_len = len;
|
|
memcpy(last->e_name, name, len);
|
|
pval = last->e_name + len;
|
|
memcpy(pval, value, size);
|
|
last->e_value_size = cpu_to_le16(size);
|
|
new_hsize += newsize;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = write_all_xattrs(inode, new_hsize, base_addr, ipage);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
|
|
if (index == F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION &&
|
|
!strcmp(name, F2FS_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT))
|
|
f2fs_set_encrypted_inode(inode);
|
|
f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode, true);
|
|
if (!error && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_CP);
|
|
|
|
same:
|
|
if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_ACL_MODE)) {
|
|
inode->i_mode = F2FS_I(inode)->i_acl_mode;
|
|
inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
|
|
clear_inode_flag(inode, FI_ACL_MODE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
exit:
|
|
kfree(base_addr);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, const char *name,
|
|
const void *value, size_t size,
|
|
struct page *ipage, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi)))
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
if (!f2fs_is_checkpoint_ready(sbi))
|
|
return -ENOSPC;
|
|
|
|
err = dquot_initialize(inode);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
/* this case is only from f2fs_init_inode_metadata */
|
|
if (ipage)
|
|
return __f2fs_setxattr(inode, index, name, value,
|
|
size, ipage, flags);
|
|
f2fs_balance_fs(sbi, true);
|
|
|
|
f2fs_lock_op(sbi);
|
|
down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem);
|
|
err = __f2fs_setxattr(inode, index, name, value, size, ipage, flags);
|
|
up_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem);
|
|
f2fs_unlock_op(sbi);
|
|
|
|
f2fs_update_time(sbi, REQ_TIME);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int f2fs_init_xattr_caches(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
|
|
{
|
|
dev_t dev = sbi->sb->s_bdev->bd_dev;
|
|
char slab_name[32];
|
|
|
|
sprintf(slab_name, "f2fs_xattr_entry-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
|
|
|
|
sbi->inline_xattr_slab_size = F2FS_OPTION(sbi).inline_xattr_size *
|
|
sizeof(__le32) + XATTR_PADDING_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
sbi->inline_xattr_slab = f2fs_kmem_cache_create(slab_name,
|
|
sbi->inline_xattr_slab_size);
|
|
if (!sbi->inline_xattr_slab)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void f2fs_destroy_xattr_caches(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
|
|
{
|
|
kmem_cache_destroy(sbi->inline_xattr_slab);
|
|
}
|